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TAYLOR V. STURGELL, PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS, AND THE DAY-IN-COURT
IDEAL: RESOLVING THE VIRTUAL
REPRESENTATION DILEMMA
Martin H. Redish* & William j. Kattt
INTRODUCTION
The notion that the individual litigant possesses a foundational
constitutional right to his day in court before his rights may be judi-
cially altered has long served as a guide for the shaping of modern
procedure.' In no area of procedure has this ideal traditionally
played a more important role than the field of judgments. Virtually
every first-year law student has learned that due process generally pre-
vents a court from imposing either res judicata or collateral estoppel
against litigants not represented in the prior litigation. 2 To be sure,
there exists a narrow group of well-accepted qualifications that allow a
nonparty to be bound when he is in privity with a prior party3 and
respected scholars have occasionally challenged the precept's valid-
© 2009 Martin H. Redish and William J. Katt. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or
below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors,
provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and
copyright notice.
* Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern
University School of Law.
t J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2009; B.S. Georgia Institute of
Technology, 2003.
1 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845-46 (1999) (discussing the
"day-in-court ideal" as it relates to class action suits).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5) (1982).
3 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1942).
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ity.4 However, the day-in-court limitation on the imposition of res
judicata and collateral estoppel has generally withstood the test of
time-that is, until the development of the doctrine of so-called "vir-
tual representation."
Virtual representation is a preclusion doctrine that permits a liti-
gant to be bound by a judgment in a prior case in which she was not a
party.5 Unlike the other primary forms of nonparty preclusion, virtual
representation (at least in some of its manifestations) does not require
a preexisting legal relationship between the nonparty and a party in
the case in order to bind the nonparty by the case's findings and judg-
ment. Instead, the nonparty is bound if her interests are deemed to
have been sufficiently aligned with a party in the prior case and cer-
tain other factors are satisfied, 6 even if there is no preexisting formal-
ized relationship between them. As of the start of 2008, the definition
of virtual representation varied widely among the federal circuits, with
at least one circuit disapproving its use almost entirely.
7
Virtual representation is in direct tension with the day-in-court
ideal. By its very nature, the doctrine deprives litigants of their right
to a day in court by binding them to judgments in cases in which they
were not parties and in which they did not have the opportunity to
defend their own interests. Because of this tension with the day-in-
court rule, virtual representation has been the subject of controversy
in the lower courts since its inception.
The Supreme Court provided important guidance on the viability
of virtual representation in its 2008 opinion in Taylor v. Sturgell.8 After
recognizing the inherent clash between the day-in-court ideal and the
doctrine of virtual representation, the Court recognized significant
tension between the doctrine and the dictates of due process.9 Specif-
ically, it unanimously rejected the D.C. Circuit's multifactor balancing
test for virtual representation. 10 In doing so, however, the Court quite
clearly signaled the demise of all versions of virtual representation.
For reasons we subsequently explore, a' the Court was correct to reject
4 See generally Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 232-88 (1992) (arguing for a less rigid approach to
nonparty preclusion).
5 See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975).
6 Different courts of appeals employed different variations of virtual representa-
tion. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
7 See Perry v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 227 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2000); Tice
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 970-73 (7th Cir. 1998).
8 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008).
9 Id. at 2171, 2173-74.
10 Id. at 2169-70, 2175.
11 See infra Part II.
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virtual representation as a general matter. In most cases, the doctrine
unconstitutionally undermines the individual's due process right to
his day in court-a doctrine whose value has generally been ignored
by those courts and scholars who have advocated some form of virtual
representation. However, the Court in Taylor failed in two important
ways: Initially, it failed to articulate the true constitutional grounding
for the day-in-court ideal, thereby leaving itself vulnerable to the
charge of some that it has overvalued this right. On the other hand,
somewhat paradoxically, the Court simultaneously overvalued the day-
in-court ideal, by rejecting virtual representation even in cases of indi-
visible relief, where the harm from failing to employ the doctrine
could well outbalance the harm from using it.
The concept of indivisible relief refers to cases in which the relief
sought by multiple parties from the same defendant demands that the
defendant take singular action-in other words, that the defendant
cannot, either legally or physically, provide wholly separate, dis-
jointed, or inconsistent relief to the various plaintiffs. For example,
when a municipality's ability to issue a bond is challenged in separate
suits, it is impossible for the municipality to issue the bond in one suit,
but not issue it in another suit; either the municipality issues the
bond, or it does not.12 Similarly, in the case of Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur v. Cauble,13 a fraternal benefit organization sought a financial
reorganization, which was challenged in separate suits by different
policyholders. 14 In this situation, either the organization financially
reorganized, or it did not; it could not reorganize as to certain plain-
tiffs while simultaneously failing to reorganize as to others. In these
situations, allowing separate suits could establish what Rule
23(b) (1) (A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning class
actions, describes as "incompatible standards of conduct."1 5 It is
important to distinguish this situation from damage suits, where a
defendant could, both practically and legally, be made to pay damages
to some plaintiffs but not to others.16 In situations of indivisible relief,
it is quite conceivable that allowing separate suits to result in "incom-
patible standards" could cause severe hardships to a defendant. In
these situations, not binding subsequent plaintiffs to the result in the
12 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (1) (A) committee note.
13 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
14 Id. at 357-59.
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) (A).
16 See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 & n.9 (9th Cir.
1976); see also Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1787, 1799
n.69 (1983) (citing several district and appellate court cases in which not all plaintiffs
were compensated).
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first suit through virtual representation might threaten the defen-
dant's due process rights, and at the very least threaten sub-constitu-
tional interests in reason and fairness.
Procedural due process has long been thought to involve a bal-
ancing of competing interests: the value of providing a given proce-
dure is balanced against the cost, either to the state or to one of the
parties, of providing it.17 For the overwhelming majority of cases, the
significant value of providing a litigant with her day in court out-
weighs the costs in providing it. Indeed, this calculus is so simple in
most cases that a commitment to the provision of a day in court has
become the presumptive rule. However, in multiple suit situations
involving claims for indivisible relief, the issue is far more complex.
In this Article, we tackle the two glaring omissions in the Taylor
Court's analysis of virtual representation: its failure to explain the the-
oretical grounding of the day-in-court ideal in American constitu-
tional and political theory and its failure to explore the implications
of indivisible relief for the viability of virtual representation. In Part I,
we explore the facts and holding of Taylor. In Part II, we fashion a
theoretical explanation of the day-in-court rule. We conclude that the
day-in-court rule springs from society's democratic commitment to the
precept of process-based autonomy. Just as the government cannot
dictate to individuals how to participate politically in the democratic
process, individuals should not be forced to defer to the judgment of
others when pursuing their legal rights. Like political participation
rights such as freedom of expression, the value of litigant autonomy is
extremely high but not absolute.' 8 In Part III, we explore the concept
of indivisible relief and its implications for virtual representation.
Indivisible relief, we believe, can be subdivided into three categories:
inconsistent liability, double liability, and contradictory liability. Each
situation raises unique due process concerns that could be substan-
tially avoided by use of virtual representation. After conducting a
detailed due process analysis, we conclude that the value of avoiding
the problems associated with double and contradictory liability is suffi-
ciently significant to outweigh the competing value of litigant auton-
omy, and therefore virtual representation may be employed to avoid
these problems. 19 It should be emphasized, however, that the threat
of double or contradictory liability is necessary but not sufficient for
virtual representation to pass due process scrutiny. As our analysis will
show, virtual representation also requires a showing that the absent
17 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-49 (1976); infra Part II.A.
18 See infra Part II.B-C.
19 See infra Part III.A.1-2.
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party has been adequately represented by a present party. Only if
both conditions are satisfied should virtual representation be
permitted.
In Part IV, we consider prophylactic measures that might be
employed to avoid the entire dilemma caused by the problems associ-
ated with indivisible relief. Despite the conclusion that our limited
recognition of virtual representation-confining its use to situations
where failure to invoke it would produce intolerable results to oppos-
ing parties-satisfies due process, it nevertheless has the harmful
effect of depriving litigants of their day in court and should therefore
be avoided if at all possible.
I. VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS
Our legal system employs a presumption that each person has a
right to her day in court. This ideal is most easily seen in the binding
effect of judgments. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel preclude parties from relitigating claims or issues that have
reached a final judgment. Because of the day-in-court ideal, these
preclusion doctrines typically bind only the parties in the underlying
suit; in most situations, imposition of a preclusive impact on a non-
party is deemed to violate due process.20 In certain situations in
which a formal prelitigation arrangement exists between a party and a
nonparty, however, the nonparty may be bound. These prelitigation
arrangements are often classified together under the heading of "priv-
ity. '' 21 Although a person in privity with a party is deprived of her
personal day in court, the nature of the preexisting relationship is
deemed to create an exception to the presumptive day-in-court ideal.
Virtual representation departs from these traditionally accepted
limitations. Unlike traditional exceptions to the day-in-court dictate,
its preclusive bar is often not grounded in a formalized prelitigation
arrangement between a party and nonparty. Instead, virtual represen-
tation, in some versions, binds a nonparty to ajudgment any time that
her interests are found to be sufficiently aligned with the interests of a
party to thatjudgment.22 Although the phrase's definition is a matter
of some debate, having aligned interests essentially means that a non-
20 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (recognizing that due process
permits preclusion of nonparties when they are "adequately represented by someone
with the same interests who is a party" (citing FED R. Crv. P. 23; Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940))).
21 See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 131.40[3] [a]
(3d ed. 2008) ("[Privity] describes those relationships that the courts have already
determined will qualify for preclusion.").
22 SeeAerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1975).
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party to the first suit would, in the second suit, advance the same argu-
ments and seek the same outcome as a party in the first suit.23
Because of the broad range of situations in which a nonparty's inter-
ests may be aligned with a party's interests, since its inception courts
have labored to find ways to restrain virtual representation. 24
The inception of the modern concept of virtual representation
can be traced to a trio of Fifth Circuit cases in the 1970s.25 The doc-
trine continued to evolve, with each circuit developing its own version,
until the Supreme Court last year called a halt to its use in Taylor.26
The Court there held that virtual representation deprives litigants of
due process because it improperly denies them their right to a day in
court before their rights are adjudicated.27 The Court rightly rejected
general application of virtual representation as a violation of due pro-
cess. Nevertheless, as previously noted, the Court's analysis in Taylor
failed to fully explain the basis for its commitment to the day-in-court
ideal and failed to recognize the dangerous competing concerns aris-
ing from indivisible relief.
A. Modern Development of Virtual Representation
Virtual representation developed originally in the area of probate
law. It provided that parties whose identity could not be determined
(for example, the unborn) could be bound by an existing party whose
interests were aligned with the undetermined party.28 In the 1970s,
however, the doctrine was transformed to apply not only to probate
cases but also in the litigation context.2 9 Initially, the litigation ver-
sion of virtual representation authorized nonparty preclusion only
when it was necessary to protect a prior judgment from being under-
mined by indivisible relief sought in a subsequent suit. 30 In this way,
the modern concept of virtual representation paralleled its traditional
23 See, e.g., In re L & S Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 929, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the interests of a principal and a guarantor who are bringing the same claims are
not necessarily aligned because the two parties might be seeking different outcomes).
24 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4457,
at 532 n.33 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2008).
25 Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008-10 (5th Cir. 1978); Sw. Airlines Co. v.
Tex. Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 97-101 (5th Cir. 1977); Aerojet, 511 F.2d at 719-20.
For a discussion of Southwest Airlines Co. and Pollard, see infra notes 96-127 and
accompanying text.
26 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2178 (2008).
27 Id. at 2176, 2178.
28 See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 4557, at 513.
29 See cases cited supra note 25.
30 See Pollard, 578 F.2d at 1005; Sw. Airlines Co., 546 F.2d at 102; Aerojet, 511 F.2d at
715, 719-20; 18A WRGHT ET AL., supra note 24, § 4557, at 513 n.2.
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role in probate as a doctrine of necessity. However, as time went on,
courts lost sight of the doctrine's grounding in necessity. 31
B. The Supreme Court Speaks: Taylor v. Sturgell
Greg Harrick filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for documents
related to an antique F-45 aircraft he was restoring.3 2 The FAA denied
Harrick's request on the grounds that the documents included trade
secrets of the aircraft's original manufacturer. 33 Harrick brought suit
in federal court, seeking to require the FAA to produce the requested
documents. The U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming
granted summary judgment for the FAA, and the Tenth Circuit
upheld the award, noting in its opinion two potential arguments that
Harrick had failed to present.
34
A month later, Brent Taylor, an acquaintance of Harrick, filed an
identical FOIA request with the FAA. After the FAA failed to provide
the documents, Taylor brought a suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia to require production of the documents. His
arguments were identical to Harrick's with the addition of the two
arguments that had been suggested by the Tenth Circuit.35 The dis-
trict court concluded that Harrick's prior suit precluded Taylor's suit
because given their identical interests, Harrick had effectively acted as
Taylor's virtual representative. 36 In reaching this conclusion, the dis-
trict court adopted the Eighth Circuit's seven-factor test for virtual
representation. 3 7 This test required an identity of interests between
the plaintiffs in both suits and in addition considered six factors that
were found to weigh in favor of virtual representation in the present
case: (1) a close relationship between the party and the precluded
nonparty; (2) participation in the prior litigation by the precluded
nonparty; (3) acquiescence to preclusion by the precluded nonparty;
(4) deliberate tactical maneuvering to avoid the initial judgment; (5)
adequate representation; and (6) a public law issue rather than a pri-
vate law issue.
3 8
31 See Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2170 (describing the D.C. Circuit's balancing test for
virtual representation).
32 Id. at 2161, 2167-71.
33 Id. at 2167-68.
34 Id. at 2168.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2169.
37 Id.
38 Id.; see also Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 454-56 (8th Cir. 1996) (establish-
ing the seven-factor test).
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The district court found that Taylor and Harrick had identical
interests in obtaining the documents and that all of the relevant fac-
tors but one were satisfied. Accordingly, the district court held that
Taylor's suit was precluded because of the disposition of Harrick's
prior suit.39 Taylor appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and that court
affirmed.40 In doing so, the appellate court adopted its own five-fac-
tor test for virtual representation, requiring both identity of interests
and adequate representation. 4 1 In addition to these prerequisites, at
least one of three additional factors had to be present: a close rela-
tionship between the party and the precluded nonparty, substantial
participation in the prior litigation by the precluded nonparty, or tac-
tical maneuvering by the prior party that indicated he was attempting
to relitigate through a proxy.42 The court found that Harrick had an
identity of interests with and had adequately represented Taylor. The
court also found that Harrick and Taylor had a close relationship.
Having satisfied its test, the court held that Taylor's suit was precluded
on grounds of virtual representation. 43 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed.
44
Justice Ginsburg began the Court's unanimous opinion by noting
that an individual is generally not bound by a judgment in a suit to
which he is not a party. 45 The standard rule, rather, is that each per-
son has a right to her day in court.46 However, the Court noted six
recognized exceptions to this rule. 47 First, if a person beforehand
agrees to be bound, she may be bound despite not being a party to the
suit. Second, a preexisting substantive legal relationship-for exam-
ple, a successor in property interest-may dictate that a nonparty be
bound. Third, in some situations a nonparty may be bound if she was
adequately represented by a party to the prior suit. Fourth, a non-
party may be bound if she controlled the prior suit. Fifth, a second
suit may be barred if the prior party is relitigating through a proxy.
Sixth, a special statutory scheme within the bounds of due process
may allow for nonparty preclusion. The Court concluded, however,
39 Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2169.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 2169-70.
42 Id. at 2170.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2171, 2180.
45 Id. at 2171.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 2172-73.
1884 [VOL. 84:5
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that virtual representation unconstitutionally exceeds the limits of
these recognized exceptions to the day-in-court requirement.
48
The Court's analysis focused on the exception for when the plain-
tiff in the first case "adequately represented" the interests of the non-
party. 49 Its elaboration, however, made clear the narrowness of the
exception, despite its seeming breadth. It developed the exception by
reasoning from its prior decision in Richards v. Jefferson County.5° In
Richards, a class of taxpayers challenged an Alabama tax under both
federal and state constitutions. 5 1 The State argued that taxpayers had
been adequately represented in a prior suit, brought by individual tax-
payers, where the tax had been upheld, and that the present suit
should be found to be precluded by the priorjudgment. 52 The Court
in Richards rejected this argument, holding that the taxpayers had not
been adequately represented. 53 The Court first noted that its decision
requiring due process in class actions in Hansbeny v. Lee5 4 stood for
the proposition that a prior proceeding must have been designed to
protect the interests of the absent party in order to bind that party by
the result of that proceeding. 55 Applying this logic to the prior tax
challenge, the Richards Court stated:
[T] here is no reason to suppose that the [prior] court took care to
protect the interests of petitioners in the manner suggested in Han-
sbery. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the individual taxpay-
ers in [the prior case] understood their suit to be on behalf of
absent county taxpayers. Thus, to contend that the plaintiffs in [the
prior case] somehow represented petitioners, let alone represented
them in a constitutionally adequate manner, would be "to attribute
to them a power that it cannot be said that they had assumed to
exercise. "56
From this negative language in Richards the Court in Taylor inferred a
positive dictate: if the interests of a litigant in a second case had been
adequately represented in the prior case, that litigant could constitu-
tionally be bound by the result in the first case.
57
48 See id. at 2178.
49 Id. at 2173-74.
50 517 U.S. 793 (1996); see Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2173-74.
51 Richards, 517 U.S. at 794-95.
52 Id. at 795.
53 Id. at 799-802.
54 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
55 Richards, 517 U.S. at 801.
56 Id. at 802 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 46 (1940)).
57 Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2172, 2174 (2008).
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For a nonparty to be bound by a judgment based on adequate
representation, the Court reasoned, one of two requirements must be
met: either the prior court must have adopted "special procedures" to
protect the absent person or the representative party in the prior suit
must have understood itself to be representing the absent party.
58
Because the D.C. Circuit's definition of virtual representation did not
include these requirements, the Supreme Court concluded that it fell
outside the recognized exception to the day-in-court rule on the basis
of adequate representation.
5 9
There is a strong argument that by limiting the "adequate repre-
sentation" exception to cases involving "special procedures" or a pre-
existing understanding, the Court effectively stripped the exception of
any meaning. The Court's only example of a sufficiently "special" pro-
cedure was a "properly conducted class action."60 Class actions, of
course, operate as an independent basis for nonparty preclusion and
it is not at all clear that any other procedures exist that would satisfy
this limit on adequate representation-based preclusion. Further-
more, the preexisting understanding requirement is strikingly similar
to the privity exception recognized by the Court for "a person who
agrees to be bound. '61 The Court cited the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments for the proposition that a person may expressly or impliedly
agree to be bound.62 It is unclear how a representative party could
understand herself to represent the interests of an absent person with-
out an express or implied agreement. Thus, the "adequate represen-
tation" exception-against which the Court tests virtual
representation-appears to be void of any independent meaning.
Whatever one thinks of the Court's questionable logic concern-
ing its "adequate representation" exception to the day-in-court ideal,
the fact remains that the exception failed to include the D.C. Circuit's
concept of virtual representation. The Court further rejected the
argument that the existing exceptions should be replaced by virtual
representation as fashioned by the lower court. First, the Court noted
that prior decisions stressed the value of the day-in-court rule, and
exceptions had been created only in discrete and narrowly limited cir-
cumstances.63 In other words, existing precedent did not support vir-
tual representation, and the Court was not about to expand that
precedent. Second, the Court reasoned that adopting a virtual repre-
58 Id. at 2174 (citing S.C. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 168 (1999)).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2172.
61 See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTs § 40 (1982)).
62 Id. at 2172 n.7 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 62 (1982)).
63 Id. at 2175-76.
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sentation balancing test to govern nonparty preclusion could render
the class certification process meaningless and effectively authorize
the creation of "' de facto class actions at will."64 Finally, the Court
pointed out that while the preclusion doctrine is supposed to reduce
the burden on the courts, the application of a complex balancing test
and the discovery required to establish its elements could give rise to
more judicial work than its use avoids. 65 The Court thus rejected the
D.C. Circuit's balancing test for virtual representation and quite prob-
ably signaled the demise of the doctrine in its entirety.
C. What Taylor Did Not Consider
At the outset, we should emphasize our agreement with the
Court's general skepticism about virtual representation. Because we
believe the day-in-court ideal reflects core democratic and constitu-
tional values, the dictate should be ignored only in the most extreme
circumstances, if at all. But while the Court has often noted its sup-
port for the day-in-court ideal as a dictate of due process, 66 surpris-
ingly, at no point has it articulated any firm conceptual grounding or
theoretical rationale for the precept. It is almost as if the Court simply
intuits the normative basis for this important requirement of procedu-
ral due process. Yet as respected scholars have noted, even where
relief is divisible the requirement is far from costless. 67 It has reasona-
bly been contended that litigation is expensive, and relitigation of
issues that have already been resolved is therefore wasteful. 68 Cost
avoidance, of course, cannot be deemed the sole value involved in the
procedural due process calculus. The problem, however, is that the
Court's failure to articulate the counter value leaves the day-in-court
ideal vulnerable to attack on the basis of the competing considera-
tions of cost and efficiency. In the following Part, we seek to fashion
an argument that the day-in-court ideal represents a core element of
the participatory autonomy that is both pragmatically and concep-
tually central to American democracy. Although it is conceivable that
counter interests may be so compelling as to overcome it, absent the
presence of such an extraordinary interest-one that must be far
64 Id. at 2176 (quoting Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 973 (7th Cir.
1998)).
65 Id. at 2176-77.
66 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846-47 (1999); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940).
67 See Bone, supra note 4, at 247-56.
68 See id. at 246-47.
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more compelling than the simple cost of litigation-the day-in-court
dictate must be followed.
II. THE DAY-IN-COURT IDEAL IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY
The Court in Taylor noted the "'deep-rooted historic tradition
that everyone should have his own day in court."' 69 Indeed, the pri-
mary reason the Court rejected virtual representation was that apply-
ing virtual representation to bar Taylor's suit would have deprived
him of his day in court. But why, exactly, is ensuring one's day in
court so important? Although the Court in Taylor outlined the estab-
lished exceptions to the day-in-court rule, it did so by merely recount-
ing precedent. The Court failed to explain why a litigant's right to
have her day in court should be protected as a moral, political, or
constitutional matter or why exceptions to that rule are nevertheless
permitted in certain situations. The following discussion provides a
theoretical framework for understanding the importance of the day-
in-court ideal.
70
A. The Background of the Day-in-Court Ideal:
Procedural Due Process Theory
In both its class action and res judicata jurisprudence, the Court
has made clear that the day-in-court precept, much like the 55-mile-
per-hour speed limit of years past, is not just a good idea; it is the law.
A litigant's right to a day in court is not merely ajudicial policy choice.
Rather, it is a constitutional directive that presumptively trumps any
legislative or judicial choice to the contrary.71 Therefore, to under-
69 Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793,
798 (1996)).
70 In an article presenting a theory of acceptable virtual representation very dif-
ferent from our own, Professor Robert Bone rejects the value (and existence) of a
day-in-court ideal. See Bone, supra note 4, at 288-89. His argument for rejecting the
ideal, fashioned prior to Taylor, is seemingly based on the conclusion that the ideal
and virtual representation are mutually exclusive: the day-in-court ideal and virtual
representation cannot both exist; virtual representation exists; therefore, the day-in-
court ideal does not exist. See id. at 288-90. This argument presumes that the day-in-
court ideal is absolute and in doing so fails to recognize the balancing of interests
inherent in any due process calculus. More accurately, the day-in-court ideal, while
not absolute, nevertheless does carry a very high value in the due process balance that
may be overcome only by the showing of truly compelling competing interests. See
infra Part II.C.
71 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (stating that the right to a day in
court is a "necessary ingredient[]" of due process (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273 (1948))).
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stand the precept's importance, it is first necessary to understand the
scope and rationale of the procedural due process guarantee.
Procedural due process theories are typically divided into two
camps: outcome-based (or instrumental) and process-based (or digni-
tary). Outcome-based theories measure the quality of procedure
based solely on the procedure's effect on the accuracy of the outcome
of cases. For example, utilitarianism, a common outcome-based due
process theory, balances the ability of a given procedure to produce
accurate outcomes against the costs of providing the procedure,
either to the other parties or to the system itself.72 If the marginal
increase in the likelihood of attaining an accurate outcome produced
by the procedure outweighs the costs of providing the procedure, the
procedure is deemed to be required by due process. If, on the other
hand, the costs of providing the procedure are found to outweigh the
gain in accuracy, the procedure is prohibited. If two procedures pro-
duce the same level of accuracy but one is cheaper to provide, the
more expensive procedure is not required by due process. This con-
clusion is unaffected by the fact that the more costly procedure might
provide additional benefits that do not affect the accuracy of
outcomes.
Process-based theories, in contrast, focus on nonutilitarian values
associated with a given procedure. 73 Such process-based theories vary
in their exact formulation, but one common characteristic is recogni-
tion of a value in permitting individuals to directly participate in the
adjudication of their rights. 74 Participation may in some circum-
stances increase the accuracy of outcomes. For example, in the litiga-
tion context, a party has a strong incentive to vigorously pursue every
possible argument because she bears both the risk and reward of the
case's resolution. To the extent vigorous advocacy enhances the accu-
racy of outcomes in the adversary system, use of a procedure that
enables participation may increase the accuracy of outcomes. A
strictly outcome-based theory would reject the constitutional necessity
of participation whenever another procedure could produce roughly
the same accuracy at a lower cost or whenever the cost of enabling
participation is deemed to outweigh the marginal increase in accuracy
produced by participation. A process-based theory, on the other
hand, values participation either for its legitimizing effect in the eyes
of the litigants or its facilitation of the citizen's role in democratic
72 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1991).
73 See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theo-
ries of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REv. 485, 509 n.10 (2003).
74 Id. at 509.
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governance, whether or not decisionmaking accuracy is improved as a
result. Thus, there may be a value in permitting each litigant to per-
sonally participate-have her day in court-that is entirely distinct
from the value in securing an accurate outcome.
It is our position that an exclusive focus on the utilitarian view of
procedural due process is unduly truncated, because it ignores values
inherent in liberal democracy that are appropriately deemed embod-
ied in constitutional guarantees of liberty. Procedural due process is
more appropriately viewed as a means of furthering and vindicating
foundational democratic values. From this perspective, the litigant's
ability to participate in the legal process as a means of vindicating his
legally protected rights is seen as a core function in the democratic
process. Participation in the judicial process, like the citizen's partici-
pation in the political process, is a means by which the individual
asserts his dignity and worth, both necessary conditions to a viable
liberal democracy. Correspondingly, by providing the citizen with the
opportunity to defend his legal rights and interests in the judicial pro-
cess, government evinces its respect for the individual, also an essen-
tial element of a viable democratic system grounded in notions of
individual integrity. Therefore, the due process protection of litigant
autonomy springs from a democratic commitment to process-based
autonomy. As one of us has previously argued, just as the "govern-
ment may not impose on [a democratic] society leaders who are
unwanted by the electorate on the grounds that the electorate does
not know what is good for it,"75 "individuals or groups should not be
required to trust in or defer to the competence, resources, or enthusi-
asm of others in the protection or advancement of their chosen
interest."
76
In fashioning the participatory right embodied in notions of pro-
cedural due process, it is important to distinguish between the con-
cepts of autonomy and paternalism. "Autonomy" means that the
individual has the right to choose how to fashion his own representa-
tion and to participate in the process as he sees fit, within the pre-
scribed adjudicatory framework. In contrast, "paternalism" refers to
the obligation of the government or other private individuals to assure
representation of the citizen's rights in the course of an adjudicatory
process in which the citizen does not directly participate. To be sure,
due process may well require some form of paternalism when, even
75 Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1581 (2007).
76 Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional
Role of Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 366 (2001).
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though his rights will be directly or indirectly affected by the outcome
of the judicial process, it is either impossible or infeasible for the citi-
zen to participate. However, when it is not beyond the bounds of
practicality for an individual to protect her own interests by being
afforded the opportunity to directly participate in the proceeding,
there is no need for paternalism to enter the procedural due process
calculus. It is only when the individual's participation is not feasible,
but her interests will inevitably be affected, that paternalism should be
employed to provide a constitutional floor of protection.
Most of the Supreme Court's procedural due process doctrine
affecting multiparties focuses on the need to satisfy the minimum
requirements of paternalism. The most authoritative statement on
the paternalism version of procedural due process came in the
landmark case of Hansberry v. Lee.77 In Hansbery, in which the Court
applied due process as a limitation on the class action procedure, the
Court noted the "principle of general application in Anglo-American
jurisprudence that one is not bound in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been
made a party by service of process. '78 Recognizing the class action as
an exception to this rule, the Court emphasized the due process limits
on this exception: "[T] his Court is justified in saying that there has
been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be
said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the
interest of absent parties who are to be bound by it."79 The Court in
Hansberry failed to address the question of whether or not the class
device permissibly infringes on litigant autonomy, even if the interest
in paternalism is satisfied. Ignoring that question, the Court instead
focused exclusively on what paternalistic protections are required to
ensure a minimum amount of fairness. These required paternalistic
protections, often grouped under the heading of adequate represen-
tation, are the primary legacy of Hansbery and form a cornerstone of
the Court's procedural due process doctrine. In the next subpart, we
explain why paternalism fails to satisfy the demands of due process.
Except in the most extreme circumstances, due process demands that
litigant autonomy be respected.
77 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
78 Id. at 40.
79 Id. at 42.
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B. Litigant Autonomy, Liberal Democratic Theory,
and the Day-in-Court Ideal
As already noted, the theoretical foundation of the nation's com-
mitment to the day-in-court ideal is grounded in democratic theory.8 0
At its core, democracy is based on the notion of self-determination.
Society as a whole expresses this self-determination through the elec-
tion of governing representatives. However, individual self-determina-
tion drives this communal expression through the individual's
participation at the voting booth. Whatever precise theory of democ-
racy one ascribes to,81 it must provide citizens autonomy in the way
they choose to involve themselves in the political system. Participation
in the activity of choosing leaders is a minimum requirement of any
democratic theory.
82
In order to effectively participate in democracy, individuals must
also have the freedom to choose how to participate in the process of
societal choice. The value of self-determination gives meaning to
political participation, and a certain zone of individual autonomy is
necessary to achieve self-determination.83 Our constitutional commit-
ment to this idea is found in both the Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment. For example, under the First Amendment, as a
general matter government may neither suppress nor compel private
expression. 84 This freedom of expression allows individuals to make
decisions for themselves, free from external forces,8 5 concerning what
80 Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 753, 764-70 (2007).
81 There exist numerous versions of democracy other than its liberal or individu-
alist form. See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 8-22
(1980) (contrasting "adversary democracy," democracy based on the theory that
democracy should weigh various selfish competing interests and where the individual
is protected through equal distribution of voting power, with "unitary democracy,"
democracy where decisions are made in face-to-face meetings by individuals with
equal power through consensus).
82 See Redish & Larsen, supra note 75, at 1581.
83 Id. at 1581-82.
84 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15
(1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment ...
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.").
85 Redish & Larsen, supra note 75, at 1582 ("Consistent with the premises of both
autonomy and self-determination, government may not control the minds of its citi-
zens. The First Amendment prohibits government from suppressing private expres-
sion on the grounds that it would lead society to make unwise policy choices. These
are decisions we leave to the individual citizens to make for themselves. They are not
to be made for the individual by external forces, ultimately unaccountable to the
electorate, who have paternalistically decided what is and is not good for both the
individual and the populace. Nor, under the First Amendment, may government
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they say and how they say it.86 The zone of individual autonomy cre-
ated by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment allows indi-
viduals to interact effectively with the political branches of
government in the exercise of democracy.
The notion of autonomy represented by voting or speech rights is
fundamentally different from the form of autonomy typically associ-
ated with general libertarian theory. Libertarian theory calls for
expansive protection of what can be called substantive autonomy.
8 7
Substantive autonomy relates to the ability to conduct our lives in the
way we choose-to own guns, to use marijuana, to cross the street.
Substantive autonomy seeks to prevent government intrusion into our
daily lives. In contrast, the ability to make choices about the way in
which we interact with the political system, or what can be labeled
process-based autonomy, seeks to assure that when the government
intrudes on our lives it is doing so in a manner that has been demo-
cratically authorized. In this way, process-based autonomy is agnostic
as to a normative commitment to any particular political policy;
rather, process-based autonomy upholds the mechanisms without
which we could not democratically express our personal policy
preferences. 88
Acceptance of process-based political autonomy leads logically to
acceptance of the day-in-court ideal; the United States' commitment
to participation in legal settings can be viewed as an outgrowth of the
political commitment to process-based participation values.89 Just as
require that individuals utter political messages with which they disagree." (footnotes
omitted)).
86 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-25 (1971).
87 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 139-75 (David Bromwich &
George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) (explaining libertarian theory's
broad view of individual autonomy); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
26-120, 268-71 (1974) (same).
88 See Redish & Berlow, supra note 80, at 765-70.
89 A notable alternative theory of participation has been developed by Professor
Jerry Mashaw in the administrative law context. Mashaw builds his theory on a norma-
tive commitment to the second formulation of the Kantian moral command that each
person be treated as end and not merely a means. SeeJERRY L. MAsHAw, DUE PROCESS
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 189-99 (1985). From this commitment, he derives cer-
tain fundamental due process values including equality and comprehensibility.
Mashaw also derives certain prudential values, including participation, that are
thought to further these fundamental values. Id. at 204. Mashaw recognizes that par-
ticipation and indeed all of his prudential values cannot be absolute, but rather "pre-
sent prima facie constitutional claims for realization." Id. He believes that an
individual's participation has value "not only because he might contribute to accurate
determinations, but also because a lack of personal participation causes alienation
and a loss of that dignity and self-respect that society properly deems independently
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citizen participation in the electoral process legitimizes the decisions
of democratic government, individual participation in the litigation
process as a means of vindicating his rights adds legitimacy to judicial
outcomes. "Individuals are presumed to have no legitimate complaint
if they were allowed to present their case in the way they chose to
present it-or, to put it another way, had their 'day in court."9 In
this way, the day-in-court ideal does much more than increase the
accuracy of outcomes; like the electoral process, it provides a founda-
tion for citizens' trust in the decisions of an organ of the government.
In one context that organ is the legislative or executive branch while
in the other context it is the judicial branch, but this difference does
not alter the fundamental democratic dynamic. The adversary system
and the day-in-court ideal each constitute an extension and further
evidence of our commitment to liberal democratic theory.91
C. Limitations on the Day-in-Court Ideal
As mentioned above, although the Court in Taylor failed to expli-
cate the theoretical underpinnings of the day-in-court ideal, it never-
theless relied on that ideal in rejecting virtual representation. The
Court recognized that the value of a party's participation in litigation
is a strong due process value that cannot be overcome simply because
a litigant's interests are similar to those of a prior litigant.
92
It would be unrealistic and unwise, however, to view the day-in-
court ideal as an absolute. Procedural due process has always been
thought to implicate some form of a balancing of interests 9 3 and
therefore, it is at least conceivable that even highly valued autonomy
interests may be outweighed by higher valued competing interests.
94
In many circumstances an individual's strategic litigation choices may
valuable." Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28, 50 (1976).
90 Redish & Berlow, supra note 80, at 769.
91 Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-
Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545,
576 (2006).
92 See discussion supra Part I.B.
93 For a more detailed discussion of procedural due process doctrine, see discus-
sion supra Part II.A.
94 This is not to suggest that some due process floor must be recognized. See
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 468-75 (1986) (explaining that the modern
Supreme Court has abandoned its former approach to due process-with certain pro-
cedures integral to English common law as a floor-and has adopted a balancing
approach to procedural due process where there may no longer be a floor).
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be overridden by competing concerns. For example, rules of evi-
dence restrict the way a case is presented. Compulsory counterclaims
force a litigant to raise claims she might have preferred to bring later.
Although neither example eliminates participation entirely, each
restricts the litigant's choices. Similarly, although participation is a
fundamental value of our litigation system arising from a commitment
to democracy, in the face of a strong enough competing concern par-
ticipation might be completely overridden within the bounds of due
process. Because of participation's fundamental nature, however, a
person should only be prevented from participating in the adjudica-
tion of her own legal rights for truly compelling reasons.
When the Court considered the legitimacy of virtual representa-
tion in Taylor, it was not presented with any compelling reason to pre-
vent participation; the gain in efficiency, standing alone, was deemed
insufficient. 95 As the unanimous decision suggests, the Court appar-
ently thought that Taylor was an easy case from a procedural due pro-
cess standpoint. As the following Part makes clear, however, the
situation is not always as simple.
III. INDMSIBLE RELIEF, DUE PROCESS, AND VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION
Indivisible relief refers to situations in which the relief granted in
one suit and the relief sought in a second suit cannot be treated sepa-
rately-in other words, one is necessarily tied to the other. Indivisible
relief situations often involve cases in which injunctive relief is sought.
For example, a judgment in one case might require that the defen-
dant take a specific action, while a different plaintiff in a later suit
against the same defendant might seek relief that would prohibit the
defendant from taking that very action. If the requested relief were to
be ordered in the second suit, the defendant would be prohibited by
law from performing the very act he had been required to perform in
the first suit. In this scenario, the relief requested in the second suit is
indivisible from the relief granted in the first suit because as a practi-
cal matter the defendant can physically comply with only one of the
conflicting orders.
In recognizing the dangers of indivisible relief to a defendant in
multiple suits where inconsistent relief is sought, it is important to
draw certain distinctions. The serious danger the defendant faces
does not arise unless the relief is, in fact, truly indivisible. Thus, as
long as it is physically possible for a defendant to treat different plain-
tiffs differently, the mere possibility of aesthetic inconsistency between
95 Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2175-77 (2008).
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the two suits should not be deemed prohibitive. To understand the
distinction, consider two decisions from the Fifth Circuit: Southwest
Airlines Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc.96 and Pollard v. Cockrell.97
In Southwest Airlines Co., plaintiffs-first the City of Dallas98 and later a
group of airlines99-in two separate suits sought to apply a city ordi-
nance to exclude Southwest from the Dallas airport known as Love
Field.100 In the first suit, the district court found in favor of Southwest
and against the city, holding that the ordinance could not be properly
applied to Southwest.10 1 In the second suit, the airlines effectively
sought the same relief against Southwest that had been denied to the
city in the prior suit. 10 2 Because the airlines had not yet had their day
in court, however, it seemed that there was a danger that the second
suit could undermine, if not effectively revoke, Southwest's victory in
the prior case: in the first suit Southwest had successfully prevented its
exclusion from Love Field, yet a successful suit by the airlines would
obliterate that victory. Under the traditional day-in-court ideal, how-
ever, the second group of plaintiffs could not constitutionally be
bound by the decision in the first suit. The airlines were clear that
their goal in bringing the litigation was to undo the effect of South-
west's original judgment. 10 3 The district court in the first suit issued a
preliminary injunction preventing the airlines from relitigating the
question of whether the Dallas ordinance barred Southwest from
operating at Love Field. 10 4 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction
on the grounds that the airlines were bound by the original
judgment.
10 5
It is puzzling that the Fifth Circuit emphasized that its decision to
preclude the airlines' suit was not based on a theory of virtual repre-
sentation. The court noted that the "doctrine offers little analytical
96 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977).
97 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978).
98 City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Tex. 1973), affd, 494
F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974).
99 Sw. Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Tex. 1975),
affd, 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977).
100 Sw. Airlines Co., 546 F.2d at 87-88.
101 Id. at 88.
102 Id. at 88-89.
103 Id. at 89 ("'This is [not] an effort to undermine the federal decision [in the
first case].... This is a frontal attack on it. The word undermined implies something
covert about it. We come in with flags flying.'" (first alteration in original) (quoting
at attorney at oral argument for Continental Airlines)).
104 Sw. Airlines Co., 396 F. Supp. at 683-86.
105 Sw. Airlines Co., 546 F.2d at 100.
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assistance . . .because of its wide and inconsistent application." 10 6
Southwest had argued that virtual representation applied to bind the
second group of plaintiffs in part because the City of Dallas, as a gov-
ernmental body, had the power to represent private interests.10 7 The
court agreed with this position, but declined to "identify[] the doctri-
nal scope of virtual representation"108 because it believed the case
could be resolved without relying on that doctrine. 10 9
The court found that res judicata-even without resort to virtual
representation-barred the airlines' claims because their interests
had been adequately represented by governmental authorities. 110
The primary focus of the court's inquiry was the degree to which the
airlines' interests aligned with the interests of the City of Dallas in the
initial suit. According to the court: "Because [the] legal interests of
the carriers do not differ from those of Dallas in ... [the first suit, City
of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co."'], we hold that they received ade-
quate representation in the earlier litigation and should be bound by
the judgment in that litigation.""
12
Although the court expressly declined to rely on a theory of vir-
tual representation by name, its focus on alignment of interests and
adequate representation is strikingly similar to that doctrine. Indeed,
in a later case, the Fifth Circuit noted that its holding in Southwest
Airlines was actually based on the theory of virtual representation.'
13
Thus, Southwest Airlines is properly viewed as a virtual representation
case in which the court found that the interests of the airlines and the
City of Dallas were sufficiently aligned to bind the airlines to the origi-
nal suit.
106 Id. at 97.
107 Id. at 97-98.
108 Id. at 97.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 100.
111 371 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Tex. 1973), affd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974).
112 Sw. Airlines Co., 546 F.2d at 100.
113 See Freeman v. Lester Coggins Trucking, Inc., 771 F.2d 860, 864 (5th Cir.
1985). There the court stated:
[B]oth from Southwest Airlines itself and the succeeding decisions of this cir-
cuit, the concept of "adequate representation" does not refer to apparently
competent litigation of an issue in a prior suit by a party holding parallel
interests; rather, it refers to the concept of virtual representation, by which a
nonparty may be bound because the party to the first suit "is so closely
aligned with his [the nonparty's] interests as to be his virtual representative."
Id. (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v.
Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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In addition to its reliance on the parties' alignment of interests in
the two suits, the court in Southwest Airlines recognized the fact that
the relief sought in the second suit was indivisible from the relief
granted in the first suit.114 The court concluded its opinion with a
discussion of due process, noting several factors that led to its finding
of preclusion:
[T]he due process balance must include the damage relitigation
would visit upon the judicial system and Southwest. As discussed
above, relitigation would constitute a blatant disregard for the deci-
sion of this Court and for the judgment of the federal district court
in [City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co.] .... It would threaten the
rights granted Southwest by the [ City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines
Co.] judgment. And finally, it would subject Southwest to the possi-
bility of conflicting judgments.
1 15
This calculation of the harm that could be visited upon Southwest
were preclusion not to be invoked is important in understanding the
contours of virtual representation. The court was hesitant to permit
nonparty preclusion because it would deprive the airlines of their day
in court. However, the court faced a situation in which the relief
sought in the second case would inevitably undermine the relief
granted in the first case: Southwest could not simultaneously leave
Love Field and remain at Love Field. One can infer from the court's
emphasis on alignment of interests that its desire to maintain the orig-
inal judgment, on its own, could not establish virtual representation;
however, when it was combined with the additional finding of ade-
quate representation based on the alignment of interests of the plain-
tiffs in the two suits, virtual representation provided the court with a
mechanism for preserving the prior judgment and maintaining a min-
imum amount of procedural fairness for the precluded nonparty.
In contrast to Southwest Airlines, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Pol-
lard illustrates the absence of indivisible relief. In an effort to curb
illicit sexual behavior, the City of San Antonio passed an ordinance
strictly regulating massage parlors.116 A group of massage parlor own-
ers brought a suit challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance in
114 Sw. Airlines Co., 546 F.2d at 101 ("If courts could second guess another court
each time a new litigant, dissatisfied with the previous judgment, filed a new com-
plaint, the respect of the previous parties or of the public toward the courts would
inevitably decrease.... Southwest and subsequent litigants would suffer the harass-
ment and expense of still later lawsuits, as well as the possibility of numerous conflict-
ing judgments.").
115 Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
116 Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1004-05 (5th. Cir. 1978).
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state court.1 17 The state trial court found that certain provisions of
the statute were unconstitutional and therefore enjoined the enforce-
ment of those provisions.118 Both parties appealed, and the state
intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the statute was
constitutional in its entirety. 119
After the trial court's decision in the state suit, another group of
massage parlor owners brought suit in federal court, challenging the
statute's constitutionality.1 20 The federal district court found that one
additional provision violated the Constitution. 121 Before reaching the
merits of the case on appeal, the Fifth Circuit faced the question of
whether or not virtual representation precluded the federal suit based
on the resolution of the state suit.12 2 The court began its analysis with
the definition of virtual representation it had previously adopted in
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew. 123 Because the massage parlor owners in
the state case and those in the federal case both sought to enjoin
enforcement of the ordinance, they appeared to have aligned inter-
ests. 124 The Pollard court, however, held that the relationship between
the two sets of plaintiffs was not close enough to justify a finding of
virtual representation. 25 Instead of focusing on whether each set of
owners had the same goal in the litigation-which had been the focus
in Aerojet and Southwest Airlines- the court in Pollard shifted its focus
to the lack of a substantive legal relationship among the owners. The
court stated, "[v]irtual representation demands the existence of an
express or implied legal relationship in which parties to the first suit
are accountable to non-parties who file a subsequent suit raising iden-
tical issues."'126 Because no such express or implied relationship
existed in the case, the court refused to find preclusion.
An important element of this case overlooked by the court was
that, unlike in Southwest Airlines, the relief sought in the second case
was divisible, both legally and practically, from the relief granted in
the first.127 In Southwest Airlines, the first suit determined that an ordi-





122 Id. at 1006-08.
123 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975); see Pollard, 578 F.2d at 1008.
124 Pollard, 578 F.2d at 1008.
125 Id. at 1008-09.
126 Id. at 1008.
127 For a complete discussion of the problems that arise from indivisible relief, see
infra Part III.A. For present purposes, we only note that the relief in both Aerojet and
Southwest Airlines was indivisible whereas the relief in Pollard was not.
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nance did not apply to Southwest. The second suit sought a determi-
nation that the ordinance applied to Southwest-a result that would,
of course, have been directly inconsistent with the conclusion of the
court in the first case. As a practical matter, these forms of relief
could not have been treated independently: the ordinance either
applied to Southwest or it did not. In Pollard, however, the first suit
determined that the ordinance applied to one set of massage parlor
owners and the second suit sought a determination that it did not
apply to a different set of owners. Although both suits were based on
similar legal claims, the relief sought in each case could have been
treated separately; the statute would simply have remained applicable
to one group of owners but not to the other. Because there was no
danger of indivisible relief, virtual representation should not have pre-
cluded the second suit. Thus, Pollard was correctly decided, albeit not
primarily for the reasons it gave.
The threat of indivisible relief creates significant problems for
strict adherence to the day-in-court ideal. In some situations, a second
judgment may effectively undermine a party's prior victory. This was
the situation the court faced in Southwest Airlines. Ajudgment in favor
of the competitor airlines would have required Southwest to leave
Love Field, despite Southwest's judgment from the first suit permit-
ting it to stay. The second judgment could thus have forced South-
west to forgo a benefit that it is legally entitled to. It seems intuitively
obvious that such a situation should be avoided if at all possible.
If the court in Southwest Airlines had considered the day-in-court
ideal to be absolute, however, it could not have invoked virtual repre-
sentation. Whether or not the City of Dallas could adequately
represent the airlines' interests in a paternalistic sense, there is no
doubt that their due process interests in autonomous control of their
litigation had been denied. The Supreme Court's sweeping rejection
of virtual representation in Taylor seemingly dictates a similar result.
Because of the balancing nature of procedural due process, however,
it is necessary to examine more closely the problems to which indivisi-
ble relief could conceivably give rise to determine whether or not the
value in avoiding those problems is sufficiently compelling to out-
weigh the value of preserving a litigant's right to her day in court.
The following subparts examine indivisible relief in detail, explore
and apply the reigning procedural due process doctrine, and propose
a coherent theory of virtual representation designed to reconcile the
powerful competing interests.
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A. The Difficulty of Indivisible Relief
Although indivisible relief may arise in many legal situations, and
occasionally has been legally recognized-most notably, in the cir-
cumstances recognized by Rule 23(b) (1) (A) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 128 concerning class actions-the problem has never
been comprehensively analyzed, particularly in relation to resjudicata
and the day-in-court ideal. To fully understand this uncharted legal
topic, we have organized indivisible relief into three distinct subcat-
egories which we refer to as "double liability," "contradictory liability,"
and "inconsistent liability." This subcategorization is useful for two
reasons. First, each subcategory represents a specific application of
the problem of indivisible relief. Second, each subcategory gives rise
to distinct due process problems. Because of their differing problems,
the subcategories produce differing weights in the due process bal-
ance and therefore must be kept conceptually distinct. The following
sections define each subcategory and describe the problems uniquely
associated with each.
1. Double Liability
The core element of the concept of double liability, as we define
it, is the existence of an indivisible "stake." A stake is "[s]omething
(such as property) deposited by two or more parties with a third party
pending the resolution of a dispute."12 9 A stake may take the form of
a specific sum of money, such as a capped insurance policy, or an
identifiable piece of real or personal property. The person with
whom the stake is deposited is called the stakeholder. A stake could
conceivably be divisible, as where separate claims may legally be
apportioned (for example, individual damage claims into an insur-
ance fund). However, where mutually inconsistent claims may be
made to the whole stake, the danger to the stakeholder of double lia-
bility arises. Assume that claimant A sues the stakeholder for the
entire stake, and the stakeholder defends on the grounds that B is
actually the proper recipient. Assume, however, that a jury finds that
A is the proper recipient, and awards the stake to A. Now assume that
B files a subsequent suit against the stakeholder, asserting his legal
right to the stake. Under traditionally accepted due process princi-
ples, the defendant stakeholder may not assert issue preclusion
128 See FED. R. Cry. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (permitting class action when maintenance of
individual suits could subject the party opposing the class to a risk of incompatible
standards of conduct).
129 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (8th ed. 2004).
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against B on the basis of the prior judgment in A's suit, because B has
not yet had his day in court.1 30 Thus, it is conceivable that a second
jury could find for B, thereby legally requiring the stakeholder to pay
twice, when in theory he could only be liable to pay either A or B, but
not both.
Double liability on a defendant raises significant due process
problems. Although the stakeholder was charged with holding a spe-
cific sum of money and she is obligated to pay out this sum to the
proper claimant or claimants, the outer limits of the stake confine her
legal obligations. As the Supreme Court has stated, "the holder of
such property is deprived of due process of law if he is compelled to
relinquish it without assurance that he will not be held liable again in
another jurisdiction or in a suit brought by a claimant who is not
bound by the first judgment."'
3
1
The constitutional danger of double liability could be avoided, of
course, if we were to deem B in the later suit legally bound by the
result in the first suit brought by A. Under traditional due process
analysis, however, B could not be bound unless he were found to be in
privity with a party to the first suit. But privity has traditionally been
deemed narrowly confined to a small set of preexisting legally defined
relationships,132 and absent one of those situations, we are presented
with a serious dilemma: either we deprive B of his day in court in
contravention of due process (at least from the autonomy perspec-
tive), or we expose the stakeholder to the risk of unconstitutional
double liability.
Use of virtual representation would avoid the problem by binding
B to a party to the prior litigation who had adequately (if unsuccess-
fully) represented B's interests. In our hypothetical, that would be the
stakeholder who, we can presume, vigorously asserted the position
that B was the proper claimant. The problem, however, is that if one
adopts (as we do) an autonomy rationale for procedural due pro-
cess, 133 the fact that the stakeholder may have "adequately" repre-
130 It is, of course, conceivable that the danger of double liability could have been
avoided in federal court either through the stakeholder's use of interpleader, see 28
U.S.C. § 1335 (2006); FED. R. Civ. P. 22; B's intervention into the first suit, see FED. R.
Clv. P. 24; or the stakeholder's invocation of Rule 19 in the first suit to have B
declared a necessary or indispensible party, see FED. R. Civ. P. 19. However, under
certain circumstances these devices may not be legally available, and since they are
not compulsory, they may not have been employed. See discussion infra Part V.A.
131 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961) (citing Anderson
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1944)).
132 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
133 See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
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sented B's interests in the first litigation is wholly irrelevant: B has not
had his constitutionally dictated day in court, because he has not yet
had an opportunity to assert and defend his own rights.
In this sense, the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor correctly
recognized the troubling implications of virtual representation for
procedural due process. What it failed to recognize, however, was the
gradation in the stakes of refusing to invoke virtual representation.
When the claims in the respective suits are legally divisible, as where
the plaintiffs in the separate suits seek individual damages, the nega-
tive consequences of adhering to due process are relatively minimal:
they are simply the costs to efficiency of relitigating. However, where
the relief in the two suits is indivisible in a manner that imposes on a
defendant the risk of double liability, we are presented with a serious
constitutional dilemma. Before we seek to resolve that dilemma, how-
ever, it is first necessary to explain the other categories of indivisible
relief, so that we may develop a holistic, comprehensive resolution of
the problem.
2. Contradictory Liability
Contradictory liability occurs when a litigant faces an injunction
awarded in case 1 commanding her to do Xand an injunction in case
2 commanding her not to do X. Unlike double liability, contradictory
liability does not involve an indivisible stake. Instead, the indivisible
nature of contradictory liability centers around the inherent irrecon-
cilability in the litigant's legally dictated actions: she cannot simultane-
ously do X and not-X.
As an example of contradictory liability, consider the facts in Aer-
ojet. In the first case, Aerojet won a judgment for specific perform-
ance of the sale of a piece of land from both the Florida State Board
of Trustees and the Florida Board of Education (collectively, State
Boards).1 34 In the second case, Dade County sought specific perform-
ance of the sale of the same piece of land from the State Boards.'13 5
Had the second suit succeeded, the State Boards would have been
faced with contradictory judgments requiring them to sell a single
piece of land to two different parties. In that situation, there is no
action the State Boards could have taken that would not have violated
at least one of the judgments.
The due process problems imposed upon the defendant by con-
tradictory liability are just as devastating as those in the case of double
134 See 511 F.2d 710, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Kirk, 318
F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Fla. 1970)).
135 Id. at 713-14.
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liability. Contradictory liability places a litigant in a situation in which
any action she takes will violate a valid court judgment. If a litigant is
simultaneously required to do X and not to do X, satisfying one
requirement necessarily violates the other. Because in Aerojet each
judgment could have been enforced by the state, failing to comply
with one judgment is presumably punishable as contempt. It should
not require complex analysis to recognize that it violates due process
to punish someone for failing to do something she is legally or physi-
cally incapable of doing. 13 6 As Lon Fuller observed:
A man who is habitually punished for doing what he was ordered to
do can hardly be expected to respond appropriately to orders given
to him in the future. If our treatment of him is part of an attempt
to build up a system of rules for the governance of his conduct, then
we shall fail in that attempt. On the other hand if our object is to
cause him to have a nervous breakdown, we may succeed.
137
Professor Henry Hart made a similar point: "People repeatedly
subjected, like Pavlov's dogs, to two or more inconsistent sets of direc-
tions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could not fail in
the end to react as the dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer
a nervous breakdown. ' 138 By punishing litigants for acting as they are
required by legal judgments, contradictory liability inherently violates
due process and therefore must be avoided.
Once again, use of virtual representation could conceivably avoid
many of the constitutional problems to which contradictory liability
gives rise. If the defendant in case 1 vigorously (albeit unsuccessfully)
asserted the second plaintiffs legal position, the second court might
conclude that that plaintiffs interests were adequately represented in
the first case and therefore bind the second plaintiff, through issue
preclusion, to the result in the first case. By summarily rejecting the
doctrine of virtual representation, 139 the Court in Taylor left unre-
strained the potential constitutional dangers of contradictory liability.
136 See Soci&td Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209-12 (1958).
137 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALIT OF LAW 66 (rev. ed. 1964).
138 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 489 (1954); see also Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules
of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARv. L. REV. 356, 381 (1977)
(discussing the difficulties that arise under the Erie doctrine when actors do not know
which set of rules will govern their actions).
139 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
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3. Inconsistent Liability
Inconsistent liability occurs when a litigant obtains an injunction
authorizing (but not requiring) her to do X and later faces an injunc-
tion preventing her from doing X Like contradictory liability, the
indivisible nature of inconsistent liability centers around the litigant's
out-of-court actions: she cannot both do X and not do X. The nature
of the initial judgment is what distinguishes inconsistent from contra-
dictory liability, however. In the case of contradictory liability, the first
judgment requires the litigant to do X In this situation, if a subse-
quent judgment requires her not to do X, any action the litigant takes
will necessarily violate one judgment or the other. In the case of
inconsistent liability, in contrast, the first judgment merely permits a
litigant to do X. If a subsequent judgment requires her not to do X, it
is of course legally and physically possible for her to simply forgo the
benefit of her initial judgment. It does not follow, however, that the
system should necessarily be unconcerned by a second judgment's
effective destruction of a right won by a party in the first suit. Again,
the problem could be avoided by invocation of virtual representation
to bind the second plaintiff to the result imposed on the plaintiff in
the first case, as long as the first plaintiff is deemed to have adequately
represented the second plaintiffs interests. However, the Court in
Taylor exposed litigants involved in multiple litigation to the negative
consequences of inconsistent liability by summarily rejecting virtual
representation. Although adequate representation can safeguard
against an erroneous deprivation of the substantive benefits of one's
legal rights, no safeguard can prevent virtual representation from
depriving a litigant of her autonomy. The only way to prevent the
deprivation of litigation autonomy is to allow the litigant to participate
in the adjudicatory process, which would render useless a procedure
such as virtual representation that is designed to prevent such partici-
pation. In order for a procedure that prevents participation to pass
due process scrutiny, therefore, an interest must exist that is suffi-
ciently compelling to outweigh litigant autonomy.
As an example of inconsistent liability, consider the facts in South-
west Airlines. In its first suit against the City of Dallas, Southwest
obtained a declaratory judgment stating that the city ordinance did
not apply to Southwest and therefore, Southwest could stay at Love
Field. 140 In a later suit, competitor airlines sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the city ordinance did apply to Southwest and therefore,
140 City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Tex. 1973),
affd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Southwest had to leave Love Field.1 4I Here, if the competitor airlines
won the second suit, Southwest could elect to leave Love Field,
thereby complying with the second judgment and forgoing the bene-
fits of the first judgment. In this way, it is possible for the judgments
to coexist.
In order for the two inconsistent judgments to coexist, however,
the holder of the first judgment must be forced to forgo the fruit of
her prior victory. As one of us has argued elsewhere in the analogous
context of Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) class actions, " [t] o completely deny a liti-
gant the benefit of its successful litigation imposes severe harm that
should be avoided if at all possible."' 4 2 A successful litigant possesses
a property interest in a valid judgment that it has won through suc-
cessful litigation. A chose in action has thereby been converted into a
more definite form of property right-a judgment. When a risk of
inconsistent liability exists, maintaining the second suit risks under-
mining the value of the first judgment, depriving the holder of that
judgment of her property without due process of the law.
We are quite sympathetic to the important constitutional values
underlying the day-in-court ideal. Therefore, as a general matter, we
concur in rejection of virtual representation because it contravenes
core notions of procedural due process. 143 However, as we have
argued, in cases of indivisible relief the problem is not as simple as the
Court in Taylor seemed to believe. As previously noted, procedural
due process has long been thought to require some form of interest
balancing. 144 It is at least arguable that the competing interests that
counter the day-in-court ideal in cases of indivisible relief should be
deemed to overcome the concededly important interest in allowing a
litigant to defend his rights in court.
By analyzing the competing interests implicated in the three cate-
gories of indivisible relief litigation, we seek to resolve the dilemma of
virtual representation. The upshot of our analysis is that the interest
in avoiding the problems associated with double and contradictory lia-
bility is sufficiently compelling to overcome even the constitutionally
significant value of litigant autonomy. Both double and contradictory
liability give rise to violations of due process either by forcing the
stakeholder to pay a single debt twice or by punishing a litigant for
failing to perform physically or legally impossible acts. It is inconceiv-
141 Sw. Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 87-89 (5th Cir. 1977).
For a more detailed discussion of Southwest Airlines Co., see supra Part III.
142 Redish & Larsen, supra note 75, at 1606.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
144 See supra text accompanying note 17.
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able that a system committed to fundamental fairness and the rule of
law could tolerate such unfairness and legal incoherence except in
the most dire of circumstances. Thus, as long as a court has assured
itself that a litigant in the first case has adequately represented the
interests of the litigant in the second case, 145 we reluctantly conclude
that in these situations, virtual representation should be invoked. 146
However, where, the court concludes that the litigant in case 2 was not
adequately represented in case 1, the day-in-court ideal should over-
come even the incoherent and unfair consequences of both contra-
dictory and double liability.
Whether or not the interest in avoiding the problems associated
with inconsistent liability is sufficient to outweigh litigant autonomy is
a much more difficult question than in the other two categories,
because the problems arising from inconsistent liability do not
include actual legal impossibilities. As discussed earlier, a protected
property interest exists in an injunction permitting its owner to do X.
Although a subsequent judgment preventing that person from doing
X deprives her of the practical benefit of her original judgment and
should be avoided where feasible, the fact remains that the two judg-
ments can be reconciled by forcing her to forgo the benefits of the
first judgment.
While as a general matter it is preferable to avoid such situations,
it is important in fashioning our due process calculus to recall that the
first judgment is, by its terms, binding only between the parties to the
original case. In other words, the winning litigant's right to do X has
been settled, but only between her and her former opponent, not
between her and the world. To understand the distinction, one might
well draw an analogy to the long-accepted distinction between judg-
ments that are pure in rem (which bind the world) and those in the
nature of rem (which bind only the particular persons named in the
suit).147 In the context of inconsistent liability, because the firstjudg-
ment permitting its owner to do X presumably did not purport to
bind the world, that litigant should, from the outset, be aware that
145 For an examination of what constitutes adequate representation, see supra text
accompanying notes 49-65.
146 We do, however, suggest a variety of ways to prophylactically avoid such situa-
tions from arising in the first place. See discussion infra Part IV.
147 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 n.17 (1977) (noting that while "'[a]
judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property,"' an action
in the nature of rem "'seek [s] to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property
and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular per-
sons"' (second emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12
(1938))).
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later suits might arise that might have the effect of undermining her
judgment in the prior suit. Although she may have no specific knowl-
edge of the person who will later bring suit against her, she must
nonetheless be aware of the possibility of subsequent suits by plaintiffs
not involved in the first suit.
Our conclusion that double and contradictory liability should be
deemed sufficiently compelling to overcome a litigant's competing
autonomy interest, it should be emphasized, does not automatically
mean that virtual representation will be permitted when these types of
relief are sought. The possibility of the first two categories of indivisi-
ble relief is necessary but not sufficient for virtual representation to
pass due process scrutiny. As already noted, there must also be assur-
ance that the precluded party was adequately represented in the ini-
tial suit to which she will be bound. Adequate representation ensures
that the precluded nonparty is not erroneously deprived of the sub-
stantive benefits of her legal rights. Due process requires at least this
floor of procedural protection even in the face of competing interests
that are compelling enough to outweigh litigant autonomy. The next
subpart examines the contours of the concept of adequate representa-
tion in the virtual representation context.
B. Defining Adequate Representation
The concept of adequate representation is not new. To the con-
trary, it has long been a central part of class action doctrine and forms
the basis for much of the Court's procedural due process discussion in
nonparty preclusion cases.' 48 Particularly in the class action context,
adequate representation is a fairly developed concept. As a prerequi-
site for class certification, Rule 23 (a) (4) provides that "the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the
class.' 4 9 This language has been interpreted to require that the rep-
resentative party's interests be aligned with the represented party's
interests, 150 the representative party have incentive to litigate vigor-
ously, 15 ' and the representative party have sufficient resources to liti-
148 See FED. R. Cfr. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring fair and adequate protection of the
interests of the class by the representative party as a prerequisite to class action); Tay-
lor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2173-74 (2008) (discussing adequate representation in
the context of nonparty preclusion); Richards v. Jefferson County., 517 U.S. 793, 798
(1996) (same).
149 FED. R. Cir. P. 23(a)(4).
150 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1769
(3d ed. 2005).
151 Id. § 1766.
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gate vigorously. 152 These three concepts should also form the basis
for the inquiry into adequate representation for purposes of virtual
representation.
Any definition of adequate representation must demand align-
ment of the interests between the representative party's and the repre-
sented party's interests. Because virtual representation does not
require a formalized preexisting legal relationship between the par-
ties, there is no reason to believe that the representative party is specif-
ically advancing any interests other than her own; in other words, she
is not necessarily looking out for the absent party. However, if the
representative party's interests are inevitably and inescapably aligned
with those of the represented party, the represented party's interests
will be indirectly protected. This alignment of interests refers to a
desire for the same outcome and the availability of the same legal the-
ories in pursuit of that outcome. 53 If the absent party possesses legal
rights that the representative party is incapable of raising, the repre-
sentative party's interests cannot properly be deemed sufficiently
aligned with those of the absent nonparty. Conversely, if the repre-
sentative party desires the same outcome and has access to the same
arguments as the absent party, their interests are aligned, even if they
have different reasons for pursuing the same outcome. For example,
in Southwest Airlines, the City of Dallas and the competitor airlines
each sought to force Southwest to leave Love Field and each
presented the same legal arguments.1 5 4 Their interests were aligned,
despite the fact that the City of Dallas wanted to force Southwest out
in order to ensure the success of the new Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport
while the competitor airlines wanted to prevent a competitor from
using the more convenient Love Field, thereby gaining a competitive
advantage.
155
The second requirement of adequate representation is that the
representative party possess sufficient incentive to vigorously litigate
the first suit. To ensure the presence of this incentive, the representa-
tive party must possess a significant personal stake in the initial litiga-
152 Id. § 1767.
153 See id. § 1769.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 98-115.
155 See Sw. Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 87-88 (5th Cir.
1977). While we point to Southwest Airlines as an example in determining adequate
representation, we should emphasize that as a case of inconsistent relief, rather than a
double or contradictory liability, the issue of adequate representation would not arise.
Under our stratification of the three categories, the danger of inconsistent relief
would be insufficient to overcome the competing interest in litigant autonomy. See
discussion supra Part III.A.1-3.
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tion. The motivation behind this requirement is similar to one of the
motivations behind the injury-in-fact component of standing. 156 A
party possessing a significant personal stake in the litigation is more
likely to present her case in an effective manner. In the extreme situa-
tion, this requirement prevents a sham party from binding all others
with aligned interests. At a more basic level, we simply do not trust
someone to exhaust all plausible legal arguments unless she stands to
suffer negative consequences as a result of an unsuccessful suit.
The final requirement of adequate representation is that the rep-
resentative party possess sufficient resources to vigorously litigate the
first suit. This element is purely practical. Even if the representative
party's interests are perfectly aligned with the precluded nonparty's
interests and the representative party has personal incentive to litigate
vigorously, the representative party still may be incapable of providing
adequate representation. Perhaps the party does not possess suffi-
cient resources to present her case in an acceptably effective manner.
Perhaps the party's lawyer is incompetent, despite his high fees. In
either situation, it would not be fair to say that the absent party
received adequate representation when the representative party
clearly did not provide it. Of course, perfect lawyering is not required
to satisfy this component. At the very heart of virtual representation is
the fact that the absent party may disagree with certain strategic
choices in the first suit but is nevertheless bound. Instead, this should
serve as a practical inquiry that can be overcome only by insufficient
party resources or incompetent lawyering.
We should note an important difference between making a find-
ing of adequate representation in the contexts of class actions on the
one hand and virtual representation on the other. While the ade-
quacy determination in the class action context must be made ex ante,
that determination will be made ex post in the virtual representation
situation. In class actions the court makes its adequacy finding before
the actual litigation, rendering it merely a prediction of what is likely
to happen in the future. In contrast, in the virtual representation con-
text the court in cases has the luxury of being in a position to examine
156 See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.4 (3d ed. 2008). Although the injury-in-fact requirement of standing is
designed to promote vigorous litigation, it is not sufficient for ensuring vigorous liti-
gation. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 101-02
(1991). One can easily imagine a situation in which a plaintiff has suffered an injury-
in-fact so small that he is not motivated to expend the resources necessary to vigor-
ously litigate a lawsuit. Id. Thus, requiring an adequate representative to have suffi-
cient incentive to litigate vigorously goes beyond the traditional injury-in-fact calculus.
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the conduct of case 1 to determine whether the absent party's inter-
ests had been adequately represented.
Having established a working definition of adequate representa-
tion, we can briefly return to the situations of double and contradic-
tory liability157 to understand how the adequate representation
inquiry differs for each. Suppose two suits are framed as A v. B and C
v. B. For a situation involving double liability, a stake exists and B is
the stakeholder. In the first suit, A claims a right to and receives a
judgment for the entire stake. In the second suit, C also claims a right
to the entire stake. For the reasons outlined above, we have con-
cluded that the compelling need to avoid this situation dictates resort
to virtual representation. However, this is so if and only if Cs interests
had been adequately represented in the first suit. It is clear that A's
interests and Cs interests cannot be aligned: they have inconsistent
and opposing claims to the same stake. It is possible, however, that
B's interests are aligned with Cs interests. But this would be the case
only if B had defended the first suit on the grounds that A should not
recover because C had a superior claim. In this situation, B is not
wholly without incentive because she may be exposed to double liabil-
ity down the road if A is awarded the stake in the first suit. We pro-
pose that if B's and Cs interests were aligned and B possessed
sufficient resources, there should be a presumption that B adequately
represented C-a presumption that may be rebutted only by a show-
ing that B was not sufficiently interested or competent.
In the case of contradictory liability, the situation is different.
Assume that in the first suit A wins an injunction requiring B to do X.
Presumably, B would prefer not to do X and that is why she litigated
the issue in the first place. In the second suit, C seeks an injunction
preventing B from doing X-the same position that B favored in the
first suit. As was the case with double liability, A's interests and Cs
interests cannot be aligned; they favor opposite outcomes. Instead,
even though C is now suing B and the two are seemingly adverse, Cs
interests in the second suit are aligned with B's interests in the first
suit. Assuming B had sufficient resources and incentives, the second
court should find that B adequately represented C
C. Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma: A Summary
We have now presented our due process theory of virtual repre-
sentation. We begin with a presumption in favor of protecting a liti-
157 Because we have concluded that inconsistent liability does not permit virtual
representation, it is not necessary to consider how it interacts with the adequate repre-
sentation requirement. See supra Part III.A.1.
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gant's right to a day in court but permit virtual representation in the
extreme situations that involve double and contradictory liability. Vir-
tual representation should be deemed permissible in these situations
because the value in avoiding the problems that arise from these
forms of indivisible relief are appropriately found to be greater than
the value of maintaining a litigant's right to a day in court. We do not
allow virtual representation in cases of inconsistent liability, however,
because the harm to the defendant in these situations is not as intoler-
able as in cases of double and contradictory liability. The threat of the
double liability and contradictory liability categories of indivisible
relief, we should emphasize, is necessary but not sufficient for virtual
representation. There must also be a showing of adequate representa-
tion, evaluating whether or not the interests of the representative
party and represented party are aligned and whether or not the repre-
sentative party had sufficient incentive and resources to litigate
vigorously.
IV. FINDING PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES TO AVOID THE
VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION DILEMMA
A. Procedural Devices Available to Avoid the Virtual
Representation Dilemma
We have developed a concept of virtual representation that
begins by recognizing the important due process value of litigant
autonomy as a baseline but nevertheless allows for deprivation of that
autonomy in situations involving double and contradictory liability,
assuming a finding of adequate representation. However, virtual rep-
resentation is little more than a barely acceptable ex post Band-Aid for
the problem of indivisible relief. Because it necessarily deprives liti-
gants of their day in court, virtual representation should still be con-
sidered a disfavored doctrine-an occasionally necessary evil. The
problem of virtual representation is a matter of timing. Indivisible
relief, by nature, is sought in a second lawsuit and conflicts with an
existing judgment. If the parties in the second suit had been parties
in the first suit, there would of course be no problem. By the time the
second suit arises, however, there is no way to go back in time and
make them parties in the first suit.
Developing a principled and comprehensive account of virtual
representation, however, allows us to anticipate when its use will be
necessary. If procedures are capable of operating proactively (or
prophylactically) in order to prevent the existence of separate actions
seeking indivisible relief from occurring in the first place, need for
the disfavored doctrine of virtual representation might be minimized
[VOL. 84:51912
2009] RESOLVING THE VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION DILEMMA
or eliminated. Of course, the best way to prevent situations of indivisi-
ble relief from occurring is, of course, to bring all interested parties
together in one suit so that the relief granted is binding on all. This
might happen through creative application or modification of our
existing joinder and intervention rules or by adopting new rules that
directly address the problem of indivisible relief.
There already exist numerous procedural devices available to
avoid the dilemma. The currently available joinder devices that could
conceivably be employed to avoid the harms of indivisible relief
include (1) compulsory joinder under Rule 19, (2) intervention
under Rule 24, (3) interpleader under either Rule 22 or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1335, and (4) class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) (A).15 8 Under each
Rule, one actor in the process is provided the procedural opportunity
in the first suit to include all those conceivably impacted, thereby
avoiding the risk of the virtual representation dilemma. In the con-
texts of compulsory joinder, interpleader, and the class action, the
defendant in case 1 is capable of triggering the comprehensive adjudi-
catory process. The plaintiff in case 1 may do so in the class action
context, and the potential second suit party may do so through inter-
vention into case 1. However, the devices do not always work as
hoped, either because the parties in the first suit are unaware of the
absent party's existence or lack the incentive to bring the outsider
into the suit. The goal, then, must be to incentivize the operatives in
case 1, in order to avoid the harmful dilemma created by case 2.
B. Incentivizing Avoidance of the Virtual Representation Dilemma
As previously noted, numerous procedural devices already exist
to comprehensively resolve a dispute in the first suit, thereby avoiding
the dilemma of virtual representation. 159 The difficulty is in appropri-
ately incentivizing either the litigants or absent parties in the first suit
to trigger use of one of those devices. In the discussion that follows,
we consider the possibility of developing such devices in the context
of each of the permutations of indivisible relief.
1. Double Liability
Virtual representation can occur in situations of double liability
only when the stakeholder defends the initial suit on the grounds that
the absent party's claim is superior to the present claim.1 60 It is only
158 See sources cited supra notes 130, 148-49.
159 See supra Part IV.A.
160 See supra Part III.A.I.
1913
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
in this situation that a present party could even conceivably be said to
have adequately represented the precluded nonparty by vigorously
asserting his arguments. A necessary condition for this to happen is
that the stakeholder is aware of the absent party's claim during the
initial suit; otherwise, he cannot reasonably be expected to present
the absent party's arguments. In light of this knowledge, one might
wonder why the stakeholder does not simply invoke interpleader or
compulsory joinder to allow the second claimant to protect herself in
suit 1. Indeed, this is the exact problem that interpleader was created
to resolve, at least when there exists an identifiable stake that consti-
tutes the requisite "res. '' 161 Similarly, in double liability situations, the
absent claimant's joinder is required under Rule 19(a) because a sec-
ond suit could expose the stakeholder to the risk of double liability.
1 62
The stakeholder's use of interpleader or compulsory joinder would
prevent the possibility of double liability in the future, by including all
those potentially affected in the initial suit.
One would hope that the very incentive of avoiding the risk of
double liability would sufficiently induce the stakeholder to invoke
either interpleader or compulsory joinder. However, in order to
increase that incentive, it is advisable to impose the negative conse-
quences for failure to invoke these devices in case 1 on the stake-
holder in case 2. Thus, where a stakeholder adequately represents the
absent claimant in the initial suit but fails to invoke either inter-
pleader or compulsory joinder in that suit, the stakeholder should be
precluded from binding the second claimant by virtual representa-
tion. The result would be that the stakeholder would be exposed to
the risk of double liability in case 2. This assignment of risk, one
could hope and expect, would force the hand of the stakeholder in
case 1.
Incentive-shifting mechanisms in civil procedure are not a new
concept. The Supreme Court articulated a very similar scheme over a
century ago in Harris v. Balk.163 In that case, Harris owed Balk $180
and Balk owed Epstein $344.164 Harris and Balk were residents of
161 See 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcriCE AND PROCEDURE § 1704
(3d ed. 2001).
162 See supra Part III.A.I.
163 198 U.S. 215 (1905). We cite Harris as an illustrative example of the rationale
behind assigning burdens based on information and not as binding authority. The
dispute in Harris arose from a now antiquated personal jurisdiction issue involving the
discredited quasi in rem concept. See id. at 226; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 200-01 (1977) (summarizing the facts and holding of Harris).
164 Harris, 198 U.S. at 216, 228.
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North Carolina and Epstein was a resident of Maryland. 165 When Har-
ris was in Maryland on business, Epstein was able to serve Harris with
process and, by invoking quasi in rem jurisdiction, obtain an attach-
ment requiring Harris to pay Epstein the $180 Harris owed Balk as
partial payment of the $344 Balk allegedly owed Epstein. 166 Due to a
difference in state laws, once Harris returned to North Carolina, Balk
was able to obtain a separate judgment against Harris for the same
$180.167 Harris appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that he had
already discharged his debt to Balk by paying in to Balk's creditor,
Epstein, in the Maryland suit. The Court initially noted that "[i]t
ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the payment of
any debt twice over." 168 The Court went on to state, however, that
Harris had a duty to inform Balk of the Maryland litigation at the time
it was taking place, thereby enabling Balk to defend his rights against
Epstein's claim against him. 169 The Court added that if Harris had
failed to notify Balk of Epstein's Maryland suit, it would be proper to
expose Harris to the possibility of double liability by forcing him to
pay his debt a second time. 170 This was ultimately not required
because Balk had been aware of the Maryland litigation and had cho-
sen not to intervene. 171 Based on this knowledge, the Court held that
the Maryland suit barred Balk's suit to recover the original $180 debt
from Harris. 172 As with the risk assignment system we propose here,
the scheme in Harris apportioned risk based on who had information
that could have prevented the problem.
Double liability may still arise in situations where the stakeholder
is unaware of the absent claimant's existence. In such a situation
there can of course be no case for virtual representation because no
party to case 1-neither the stakeholder nor the first claimant-is in a
position to present the absent claimant's arguments. However, incen-
tive-shifting mechanisms still may be useful to combat indivisible
relief. If the absent claimant is aware of the original suit and fails to
seek intervention, his suit could be barred. Were such an incentiviza-
tion system made clear at the outset, presumably the absent party
would have been induced to seek intervention in case 1. When the
stakeholder is unaware of the absent claimant and the absent claimant
165 Id. at 216.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 226.
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is unaware of the original suit, however, we see no way to avoid double
liability.
2. Contradictory Liability
Contradictory liability, it should be recalled, occurs when a per-
son is judicially ordered, in different litigations, both to do X and not
do X Under these circumstances, there is no action the person can
take without violating one court judgment or the other. As noted pre-
viously, this is the most severe form of indivisible relief.
Though where no identifiable stake is involved interpleader is
unavailable, when at the time of the initial suit the party potentially
subject to the risk of contradictory liability is aware of the absent party
who might bring a subsequent suit creating that risk, it is appropriate
to force that party to bring in the absent party through Rule 19 com-
pulsory joinder.173 However, where the party subject to the risk of
contradictory liability is unaware of the absent party's existence but
the absent party is aware of the initial suit's existence, it makes sense
to shift the risk to that absent party. Instead of employing virtual rep-
resentation in a subsequent suit, we could preclude subsequent suits
based solely on the fact that the absent person had knowledge of the
original suit yet failed to intervene.
The constitutionality of this type of mandatory intervention
scheme is somewhat controversial and therefore must be briefly
examined. Mandatory intervention is a concept in which a party is
required to intervene in order to protect her legal right-a sort of
"use it or lose it" doctrine. The Court addressed the issue in Martin v.
Wilks. 174 In that case, after a group of African American firefighters
received a consent decree from the City of Birmingham granting
them advanced seniority, a group of white firefighters brought a suit
alleging that the decree indirectly discriminated against them by com-
parative demotion. 175 The Court addressed the argument that the
white firefighters' suit should be barred based on their failure to inter-
vene in the original action.176 Rejecting the argument, the Court
stated:
173 Where absent parties are too numerous for simple joinder, the party may
resort to a Rule 23(b) (1) (A) class action, provided that other prerequisites are met.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (1) (A).
174 490 U.S. 755 (1989). Section 108 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(n) (1) (2000), overrode the the holding in Martin as it applied to the underly-
ing civil rights claim. However, the court's reasoning as applied to mandatory inter-
vention is still generally instructive.
175 Martin, 490 U.S. at 758.
176 Id. at 762.
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The parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else
the nature and scope of relief sought in the action, and at whose
expense such relief might be granted. It makes sense, therefore, to
place on them a burden of bringing in additional parties where
such a step is indicated, rather than placing on potential additional
parties a duty to intervene when they acquire knowledge of the
lawsuit.
77
This reasoning counsels in favor of placing the initial onus on the
existing parties: they mustjoin outsiders or risk a second suit challeng-
ing their victory. The argument breaks down, however, when it is only
the absent party who realizes his relevance to the suit. In Wilks, the
Court's reasoning is based on the assumption that parties will have
superior knowledge about who should be in the case. Whether or not
the absent person is the sole actor to have actual knowledge of the
first case's relevance to her, however, is simply a question of fact.
While making this factual determination may be difficult, as noted by
the Court in Wilks, 178 incurring this difficulty is a small price to pay for
avoiding the danger of contradictory liability. Furthermore, although
the reasoning of Wilks is generally instructive, Congress overruled its
applicability to employment discrimination cases, essentially creating
a legislatively dictated mandatory intervention scheme. 179 This statute
has not been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds, sug-
gesting that although mandatory intervention is not ideal, it is at least
constitutional. In light of the particular danger of contradictory liabil-
ity, we believe that under appropriate circumstances mandatory inter-
vention is permissible. 180
CONCLUSION
Despite the Court's recent rejection of virtual representation in
Taylor, the doctrine has never received a comprehensive constitu-
tional analysis. In this Article we have sought to provide that analysis.
After deriving the day-in-court ideal from the foundational American
political commitment to democracy, we employ the Court's existing
procedural due process doctrine to create a workable, reasonable, and
highly restricted theory of virtual representation. We conclude that
177 Id. at 765.
178 Id. at 767.
179 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (1).
180 As with double liability, situations may arise in which virtual representation or
other measures will be unable to prevent contradictory liability. As already noted, this
creates serious due process problems. This Article does not attempt to solve these
remaining problems. Instead, we have shown how virtual representation and other
mechanisms could be used to minimize the threat of indivisible relief.
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although the day-in-court ideal should be adhered to in nearly all situ-
ations, when a litigant faces a risk of double or contradictory liability
there are compelling reasons to preclude the subsequent suit. If we
can be assured that the precluded nonparty has at least received pater-
nalistic protection of her substantive rights through adequate repre-
sentation, use of virtual representation is permissible in order to avoid
the even more serious constitutional harms to which both double and
contradictory liability give rise. 181
A far better solution, however, is to avoid situations of indivisible
relief from occurring. This can be partially achieved by the use of
existing joinder and intervention rules. In addition, we have pro-
posed a system of risk allocation in cases of indivisible relief by impos-
ing the risk on the party who failed to prevent it. It should be noted
that this proposal is preliminary in nature and intended more to start
rather than end the conversation. Despite the extreme problems that
result from indivisible relief, the topic has received little treatment.
The concept is hinted at in nearly every multiparty tool, yet no one
has presented a comprehensive analysis of the topic. Although we
have focused in this Article primarily on virtual representation as a
means to combat indivisible relief, we hope the Article's greatest con-
tribution is its effort to bring indivisible relief into the due process
conversation in a cohesive manner.
181 See supra Part III.A.1-2.
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